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The Miyanaga Incident and the “Anti-Spy” Bill
 On the morning of January 18, 1980, Tokyo police arrested a retired general of Japan’s 
“Self-Defense Forces” along with two active duty accomplices and charged them with selling 
defense secrets to the Soviet Union1.  The accused spy was a man named Miyanaga Yukihisa 
who had worked in intelligence while on active duty and was described as “one of Japan’s top 
intelligence experts on the Soviet Union.”2  He would later admit to serving as a Soviet agent 
for more than ﬁve years after his retirement in 1974.  Police investigators said they searched 
his house and seized classified documents on the Self-Defense Forces, a code book and 
communications equipment.
 The story attracted heavy news coverage and became a major embarrassment to the Ohira 
government.  It even led to the ﬁrst-ever police search of the Self-Defense Force ofﬁces and to 
the resignation of the Army Chief of Staff, only ten days after the arrest3. 
 Japanese leaders had good cause for concern.  It was the height of the Cold War and 
Japan was America’s major ally in the Far East.  Relations with the Soviet Union were brittle 
not only because of the Cold War confrontation and the presence of Soviet nuclear weapons 
within easy striking distance of Japan, but also due to the ongoing diplomatic dispute over 
Soviet possession of the “northern territories.”  The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, launched 
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just a few weeks before Miyanaga’s arrest, reminded political leaders that their adversary was 
capable of real military action.
 Moreover, the Miyanaga incident carried the potential to disrupt Japan’s relations with 
the United States by raising suspicions that Japan could not be trusted with sensitive defense 
information.  American experts were contemptuous of Japan’s capabilities in this area4.  In 
fact, the Japanese government was actually informed of Miyanaga’s operation by the US CIA, 
which had obtained the information from Stanislav Levchenko, a KGB agent who had defected 
to the United States.  Levchenko had worked undercover as a journalist in Japan from 1974 
through 1979.  Without the CIA intervention, Miyanaga’s treachery may have gone unnoticed 
for a very long time.
 In order to protect national security and the all-important U. S. relationship, defense 
hawks in the ruling party called upon the Prime Minister and other leaders to support the call 
for a new information protection law similar to the British “Ofﬁcial Secrets Act.”  The Ohira 
Administration responded swiftly, producing a draft “Law to Prevent Spying and Other Acts 
Concerning Defense Secrets” in April 19805.
 As officials hammered out the wording of this “anti-spy bill” (supai bōshi hoan), 
Miyanaga and his accomplices were quickly processed by Tokyo District Court.  After only 
two hearings, the Court issued guilty verdicts, ﬁnding that the defendants had delivered eight 
separate items marked “secret” to their Soviet paymasters in exchange for a total of 3.1 million 
yen.  The documents concerned the deployment of Chinese and Soviet military forces.  The 
defendants did not contest the charges.  Miyanaga was given a year in prison and the other two 
defendants eight months each6.
 Proponents of the anti-spy bill claimed that these punishments were far too lenient; such 
brief prison terms were obviously insufﬁcient to deter other potential traitors from betraying 
their country.  For Japan’s open government advocates, on the other hand, the call for new pro-
tections for national secrets was a serious blow.  The interest they had generated in support of 
the people’s “right to know” could be easily overwhelmed by calls for even tighter controls over 
government information in order to defend the nation against foreign enemies. Leaders of the 
“information disclosure” movement saw the Miyanaga affair and the call for anti-spy laws that 
followed in its wake as serious threats to their work.
 The timing was especially unfortunate.  Open government advocates had just established 
tenuous ties with national political leadership.  Prime Minister Ohira Masayoshi had spoken 
out on behalf of a new information disclosure regime and had even taken tentative steps 
toward establishing a new system at the end of 1979.  Attracting the attention of the nation’s 
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leader had been the most signiﬁcant achievement of Japan’s open government movement to 
date.  And the Prime Minister had chosen the occasion of the traditional speech opening the 
new Diet session in January to repeat his call for study of an information disclosure system. 
Even as he was polishing the final draft of this speech, however, the security police were 
laying plans to arrest the man some were calling the biggest Japanese spy of the Cold War. 
Demands for better protection of sensitive defense information were inevitable.  If the Prime 
Minister continued to support the efforts of open government advocates, surely there would be 
a political price to pay.
Political Parties Respond to Calls for an Information Disclosure Law
 Following publication of a “Model Information Disclosure Law” by the Japan Civil 
Liberties Union in September 1979, a small team of activists contacted consumer rights 
groups, constitutional scholars, and interested citizens to join a gathering to be held in at Tokyo 
union hall on March 29, 19807.  Around 200 people came to listen to speeches and tell their 
own frustrating stories of denials of their requests for information from government agencies. 
Attendees agreed on the formation of a “Citizens’ Movement for an Information Disclosure 
Law,” a new umbrella body to lead efforts to demand a new open government law generally 
modeled on the U.S. Freedom of Information Act8.
 For their ﬁrst major event following formation of the Movement, organizers invited all 
major political parties to send representatives to another public gathering, scheduled for May 
31, 1980.  
 They called upon a well-known philosopher and public intellectual who had spent a 
lifetime speaking out against oppressive government to deliver the opening address.  Kuno 
Osamu was born in 1910.  He had been a leader of the massive protests against the US-
Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and of the well-known Beheiren movement, which opposed the 
Vietnam War in the 1960s.   Kuno had even been imprisoned under Japan’s “thought-control” 
regime of the 1930s.  Now he was identiﬁed as a member of the Citizens Movement for an 
Information Disclosure Law.
 Kuno told the audience that the demand for an information disclosure law was a symbol 
of a much larger conﬂict.  He said the 1980s would be an era of a confrontation between “forces 
seeking a return to the pre-war era” and other forces which sought to create a new and better 
world.
 His core message was that this battle would be lost and Japan would slip back toward 
militaristic government unless individual people stood up to take responsibility for their 
own fates by demanding full participation in the political process.  They would need open 
government measures like the information disclosure law in order to do so.
 Kuno said that most people feel helpless when they confront the powerful institutions 
of society.  He saw this as a fundamental aspect of human character.  According to Kuno, we 
come into the world helpless and must rely on others for protection and most of us carry this 
characteristic throughout our lives.  Humans are dependent and the political authorities exploit 
  7 For a description of the Model Law, see Lawrence Repeta, “Citizens: The Founders of Japan’s Freedom of 
Information Movement,” Meiji Law Journal, Vol. 18, (hereinafter, “Citizens.”) pp. 57-59.
  8 Concerning this event, see “Citizens,” id., pp. 63-66
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this dependency.  He said that successful political leaders remind people of their vulnerabilities 
and then reassure them.  “Do not to worry,” they say, “the government will take care of you.” 
And because the government is taking care of many things, people can live easy, comfortable 
lives.
 However, once political leaders take power, he said, they exploit the weakness of the 
people.  “They say ‘We will take care of the work you should do yourselves, so you can have 
an easy life.  So even if we are corrupt and we steal from you, do not complain.  Even if we 
sometimes start wars and take your lives, do not complain.’”9
 According to Kuno, the antidote to this problem is democracy and without access to 
information, democracy is not possible.  He explained that an information disclosure system 
would force government to create records – not opinion, but objective information, and 
disclose this to the public.  And based on this information, people could formulate opinions 
and participate in decisonmaking; democracy – a system in which the people need not rely on 
leaders who cheat and steal and take their lives – is possible.
 The philosopher was followed on the program by practical politicians representing all of 
Japan’s major political parties.  The contrast between the positions of the powerholding LDP 
(yotō) and the opposition parties (yatō) was stark.  Spokespersons for the opposition parties, 
including the Japan Socialist Party, Japan Communist Party (JCP) and others, all declared that 
they had already prepared draft information disclosure bills or were in the process of doing 
so.  The representative of one minor party, the Minshato, notiﬁed the audience that his group 
had already submitted a draft bill to the national parliament.  Izumi Shigeyuki, a Dietmember 
from the JCP, repeated themes common to open government movements all over the world, 
declaring that an information disclosure law is necessary to “pursue financial corruption 
(kinken oshoku) and to protect the people against defective drugs and other threats to daily 
life.”  The Socialist Party representative noted that, in addition to the information disclosure 
law, the country also needed a “privacy protection” law10.
 These declarations from the opposition parties would surely be welcomed by the 
audience.  But everyone knew that unless the opposition parties could somehow win an 
election and take control of the Diet, it didn’t really matter what positions they took.  Until 
they could muster a majority, all of their ﬁne proposals would quietly expire and be forgotten. 
So all eyes were on the LDP.  The party was represented at this gathering by a Dietmember 
named Chimura Shinji. 
 Chimura agreed that if the government holds information the people need, it should be 
released.  However, he wasn’t convinced that a new law was necessary at all.  Certainly the 
government already had the power to release whatever information it chose.  As for the idea of 
a special law, Chimura said the government was studying the matter; if it decided such a new 
law was necessary, it would create one.
 He summarized the LDP position as follows: “…we are not opposed to establishing 
a disclosure law in principle, however, one cannot deny that we must address the issues 
of foreign policy, privacy, and the requirement that public officials fulfill duties of 
  9 A summary of Kuno’s remarks is reported at Jōhō Kōkai, No. 2, July 1980, pp. 1-2.  “Jōhō Kōkai” is the 
newsletter of the Citizens Movement for an Information Disclosure Law.
10 Jōhō Kōkai, No. 2, July 1980, p. 3. 
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conﬁdentiality.”11
 This describes the battle line that has remained unchanged from the beginning of the 
global open government movement to the present day.  Nearly everyone agrees that the “general 
rule” should be openness; real disputes appear when we try to set boundaries that deﬁne the 
especially sensitive kinds of information that most people believe should be protected.  Open 
government advocates will forever struggle to prevent the “exceptions” from swallowing 
the “general rule.”  And in the minds of many there is nothing more sensitive than national 
security information.
Objections to the Anti-Spy Bill
 The information issue of the day was the need to protect the nation against spies like 
Miyanaga.  For Chimura and his colleagues, therefore, the top legislative priority was the 
“anti-spy” bill they had submitted to the Diet in April.  At the May gathering, Chimura sought 
to draw a fine distinction in order to clarify the intentions of the ruling party. “We are not 
considering establishing a Secrets Act,” he said, “however an Anti-Spy Law (supai bōshi ho) 
is necessary.”12
 This was the point of contention.  Did the ruling party propose to protect the nation 
against spies or to throw a vast cloak over government ﬁles?  According to Shimizu Hideo 
and other open government advocates, the anti-spy bill was a stalking horse for something 
much bigger.  One of their pamphlets explained the issue this way:  “In reality, the declaration 
that this bill will control so-called spies is just a pretext; it attempts to prohibit the efforts of 
the people to learn about national defense and foreign affairs and to inform others of such 
information.  It is a frightening plan to sharply restrict the people’s right to know.”13
 According to their analysis, the LDP bill marked a sharp departure from existing law.  The 
defendants in the Miyanaga case were military ofﬁcers with clear legal obligations to protect 
confidential information.  Similarly, in the Nishiyama case, a Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
ofﬁcial (and a news reporter) were charged with violating a statute that made it a crime for a 
government ofﬁcial to leak conﬁdential information.  This new government bill was different. 
Unlike the laws that applied in those cases, this one was not directed solely at government 
ofﬁcials; it could be applied to anybody.  Therefore, it was an intolerable prohibition on free 
speech.  None of Japan’s existing laws, they said, could be applied to “ordinary people who 
sought to learn information concerning defense or foreign relations of their own country” and 
Japan’s existing laws did not prohibit such ordinary people from “communicating information 
designated as ‘secret’.”
 Of course, they found other problems with the bill.  The deﬁnition of “secret information” 
was too vague and too broad, they said.  A law like this had the potential to completely block 
citizens’ access to knowledge about national defense.  Regarding the Miyanaga case, critics 
of the bill would claim that the information sold by the retired general and his accomplices 
11 Id.
12 Id.
13 Jiyu Jinken Kyokai, Ankoku Jidai wo Saigen Suru – Jimintō no ‘Supai Bōshi Hōan’ ni Hantai Suru, (Japan 
Civil Liberties Union, “Opposing the LDP ‘Anti-Spy Bill’ Which Would Resurrect the Darkest Era”), 
(pamphlet) May, 1985, p. 3.
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was trivial and caused no harm to Japan14.  They said that proponents of the anti-spy law could 
not cite any real cases where valuable information had been lost due to a security breach.  For 
example, the chairperson of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations would say that during 
the 25-year period from 1954 though 1981 there were just 13 cases involving leaks of sensitive 
government information and they all concerned insigniﬁcant matters.  To illustrate the trivial 
nature of these cases, critics liked to cite the 1955 prosecution of a Chinese laundryman in 
Yokosuka who gathered information on the movement of US warships in and out of the big 
US naval base there.  Of course the laundryman gathered such information, they scoffed, and 
so did every other local business that relied on American sailors to pay their bills15.
 Opponents saw the proposed law as “fraught with the danger of abuse”16 and a serious 
threat to popular government.  Some said the proposed law would impose restrictions even 
more severe than those that had existed during the pre-war period.
 More than any other factor, it was memories of the “thought control” policies of Japan’s 
war era and information controls during the postwar Occupation period that inflamed the 
passions of Shimizu, Kuno, and others of their generation.  They feared that the same kinds 
of forces that had driven their nation to suppression of dissent and to war could arise at any 
time.  The information disclosure law they proposed was intended to be a bulwark against the 
return of repression.  They saw the “anti-spy law” on the other hand, as a big step in the wrong 
direction.
 Stymied in the nation’s capital by preoccupations with spies and military secrets, Citizens 
Movement leaders would have to look elsewhere for signs of progress.
The Open Government Movement in Kanagawa
 Japan’s Constitution provides for the principle of local autonomy17, including local 
government rights to manage property, affairs, and administration within the bounds of national 
law18.  Key features of local autonomy include the direct election of chief executive ofﬁcers 
and other ofﬁcials, and the power to enact local regulations within the law19.  As the terms of 
the Constitution were negotiated in 1946, Japanese government representatives demanded that 
all local ofﬁcials be appointed by the central government in Tokyo, but democratizers among 
Occupation ofﬁcials disagreed.  They insisted that the chief executive ofﬁcers of prefectures 
and other local governments along with members of the legislative assemblies be selected by 
the votes of local residents in direct elections.  This decision would have a powerful impact on 
the development of Japan’s open government laws more than thirty years later.
 Nagasu Kazuji was a leader among Japan’s progressive local politicians of the 1970s. 
He made his ﬁrst run for public ofﬁce as a candidate for governor of Kanagawa in 1975 at 
the age of 55.  Until then, he had served as a professor at Yokohama National University.  His 
14 Speech in Danger, p. 46.
15 Speech in Danger, pp. 46-49.
16 See Shimizu’s comments reported at Jōhō Kōkai, No. 1, May 1980, pp. 3-4.
17 Constitution of Japan, Article 92.
18 Id., Article 94.
19 Id., Article 93.  See Yoshida, “Authority of the National and Local Governments Under the Constitution,” 
in “The Constitution of Japan – the Fifth Decade,” Law and Contemporary Problems, vol. 53 (Winter & 
Spring, 1990).
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specialty was Marxian economics.  In his ﬁrst political campaign, Nagasu won the backing 
of the Socialist, Communist, and Komeito parties and of labor unions and other progressive 
organizations.  Key elements of his platform included expanding the public school system, 
imposing tighter control on industrial polluters, and protesting the dangers to Kanagawa 
residents posed by the US military base at Atsugi20.
 Timing was good for such a populist politician.  Nagasu’s first election took place 
in the shadow of the Lockheed scandal, just a few months after Prime Minister Kakuei 
Tanaka resigned in November 1974 amid a raging national debate over Japan’s “money-
based politics.”21  Widespread bribery and abuse of public funds by politicians and public 
ofﬁcials had created a cynical electorate.  To Kanagawa voters, Nagasu effectively presented 
the counterpoint of a clean government policy.  In his very ﬁrst election in 1975, he already 
proclaimed “citizen participation” in government to be a key element in his platform.  He won 
this election easily.
 Kanagawa borders Tokyo to the south and west.  With a population of more than eight 
million, it ranks behind only Tokyo among Japan’s prefectures.  Its great city, Yokohama, 
is the location of Japan’s biggest port and home to a significant portion of the managerial, 
technocratic and educational elites who lead the country.  Its people tend to have a far more 
cosmopolitan and progressive outlook than Japan’s rural population, which has formed the 
bedrock of support for the conservative Liberal Democratic Party throughout its long era of 
dominance in national politics.
 Although the conservative LDP enjoyed a virtual monopoly over the national government 
since its founding in 1955, local elections of governors, mayors, and members of local 
assemblies in urban districts have been much more sharply contested.  In fact, politicians 
sponsored by Japan’s Socialist Party and other leftwing organizations frequently won local 
elections in districts with large urban populations, such as Tokyo, Osaka, and Kanagawa. 
Kanagawa residents, like other big-city voters tend to favor independents and intellectuals, 
such as Nagasu Kazuji.
Making Government a “Joint Product” with the People
 The Governor of Kanagawa heads an administration that employs thousands.  Despite his 
academic background, the new Governor proved to be a skillful manager and strategist.  It’s 
not clear when he ﬁrst heard the words “information disclosure,” but he would soon decide 
that bringing transparency to the Kanagawa prefectural ofﬁces should be a high priority.  Two 
years into his ﬁrst term, Nagasu made his ﬁrst big move in the direction of open government, 
directing the community relations department (kenmin-bu) to commence a study of how to 
achieve his “kenchō kakumei” or revolution in government ofﬁces through expanded citizen 
participation.  A small project team began work in June 197722.  This was less than a year since 
20 See www.kensyokurou.ne.jp/sosiki/rekisi6.htm. and
 www.sankei.co.jp/databox/bukko/html/990507nagasukazuji.html.
21 For background, see Jacob M. Schlesinger, Shadow Shoguns – the Rise and Fall of Japan’s Postwar 
Political Machine (Simon & Schuster, 1997) especially 78-81 and Johnson, “Tanaka Kakuei, Structural 
Corruption, and the Advent of Machine Politics in Japan,” 12 Journal of Japanese Studies vol. 1, 1 (1986)
22 Kanagawa Ken Kensei Jōhōshitsu, Kanagawa Ken no Jōhō Kōkai (hereinafter “1984 Collection”), 
(Gyosei, 1984), p. 156.
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the formation of the JCLU “information disclosure subcommittee” and fully two years before 
that group released its model information disclosure law.
 At the same time, Nagasu recruited a young marketing professional from Hakuhodo, 
one of Japan’s biggest advertising agencies, to join the Governor’s executive staff.  His 
responsibilities would include coordinating the launch of a detailed marketing plan to 
showcase the governor’s open government proposals before the voters and to persuade the 
prefectural staff to get behind implementation of the new transparency initiative23.
 After nine months of work, the project team delivered a ﬁnal report in March 1978 with 
an engaging title that matched the Governor’s progressive image:  “To Make Administration 
a ‘Joint Product’ (kyōdō sakuhin) with the People.”  Nagasu was up for re-election in 1979 
and the report would lay the groundwork for a new campaign pledge to enact an information 
disclosure system.  
 Nagasu was way ahead of the curve.  At this stage in Japan’s history, the notion of a 
citizen right to examine government files represented a radical change in the relationship 
between governors and the governed.  The concept was familiar only to a handful of academic 
and legal experts; news reporting on this topic was yet to come.  Administrators who had never 
been subject to the kind of public scrutiny suggested by this proposal must have been more 
than a little concerned.  They could be expected to share a preference for secrecy not only 
with their counterparts in national government ofﬁces in Tokyo, but in bureaucracies the world 
over.  Max Weber had identiﬁed a penchant for secrecy as one of the primary characteristics of 
bureaucracy many decades before:
Every bureaucracy seeks to increase the superiority of the professionally informed 
by keeping their knowledge and intentions secret.  Bureaucratic administration 
always tends to be an administration of “secret sessions”; in so far as it can, it hides 
knowledge and action from criticism….  The concept of the “ofﬁcial secret” is the 
specific invention of bureaucracy, and nothing is so fanatically defended by the 
bureaucracy as this attitude24.
 Nagasu would have to overcome this kind of attitude to get the administrators on board 
and make his system work.  The “Joint Product” report introduced the prefectural staff to 
such threatening concepts as “information disclosure” (jōhō kōkai) and “citizen participation” 
(shimin sanka).  These ideas were said to have “sent forth widening ripples throughout the 
building.”25
 Whatever the reaction of the administrators, the plan would surely have the support of 
ordinary voters; it enhanced the Governor’s stature as a man of the people and undoubtedly 
contributed to his re-election.  As the 1979 election approach, his opposition tossed in the 
towel.  This time Nagasu would be supported not only by socialists and other leftwingers, but 
23 This new recruit, Gotoh Hitoshi, would later serve on national committees charged with deliberating 
information disclosure policy and would be appointed to the faculty of Kanagawa University.  The author 
interviewed Mr. Gotoh on June 27, 2003.  His comments support much of the text in this section.  Where 
appropriate to provide a speciﬁc citation, cited as “Gotoh Interview.”
24 Max Weber, Essays in Sociology (Oxford University Press, 1946), quoted in Alasdair Roberts, Blacked Out 
– Government Secrecy in the Information Age (Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 11.
25 1984 Collection, p. 158.
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by the conservative LDP, too.  He would not be seriously challenged again26.
 Having safely achieved re-election in April 1979, Nagasu took his next major step one 
month later by ordering the appointment of a new Community Relations Committee formally 
charged with delivering a draft ordinance and an internal promotional plan.  This committee 
picked up where the existing work left off, extending the project internally and externally with 
research into both foreign information disclosure systems and into document retention and 
maintenance practices in Kanagawa prefectural ofﬁces27.
 Life would soon be different for the dedicated public servants who had spent their entire 
careers without the burden of an information disclosure system.  At the very minimum, they 
would have to give some extra thought when they created memoranda and other documents 
that might one day be requested and exposed to the world.  Gotoh Hitoshi, the former 
advertising executive brought in to assist in the creation of the original “marketing plan” 
would later say “Nagasu knew that what was being proposed was no mere PR program.  Under 
this new system, citizens would be able to make demands and the ofﬁcials would have a duty 
to respond.”28
 The real goal of Nagasu’s  new system was to fundamentally change the relationship 
between ofﬁcials and ordinary citizens.  By the summer of 1980, the Governor had prepared a 
powerful statement of the overall mission of his project.  He was ready to disclose his plan to 
the world.
Developments on the National Scene:  A Transfer of Power, the Role of 
the National News Media
 National politics were in a state of great turbulence in 1980.  In elections held in 
November 1979, voters denied the ruling LDP an outright majority in the national Diet. 
The party was able to take control through a coalition with a tiny splinter party called the 
“New Liberal Club.”  The need to secure this alliance had been a critical factor driving 
Prime Minister Ohira to join hands with the Club in supporting an open government policy. 
But these efforts to stitch together a majority would come to naught.  In May the fragile 
government coalition was sabotaged by Ohira’s rivals within his own party.  When the Japan 
Socialist Party submitted a no-confidence motion on May 16, a significant number of LDP 
Dietmembers led by future Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo abstained and the vote passed, 243-
187.29  The government was out.  Faced with the choice of stepping down as Prime Minister 
or calling national elections, Ohira decided to ﬁght.  The date for a “double election” of all 
members of both houses of the Diet was set for June 22.
 Ohira took to the hustings, but his health was in a delicate state and the stress of a 
national political campaign was too much.  The Prime Minister collapsed and was hospitalized 
on May 31.  He died of a massive heart attack on June 12, at the age of 70.  When the elections 
26 Nagasu retired in 1995, after twenty years in ofﬁce.
27 1984 Collection, pp. 158-59.
28 Gotoh Interview.
29 When the House of Representatives passes a vote of no-conﬁdence, Article 69 of Japan’s Constitution 
requires the Cabinet to resign or the House of Representatives to be dissolved within ten days.  If the 
House of Representataives is dissolved, Article 54 requires that a national election be held within 40 days 
of that date.
48　　MEIJI LAW JOURNAL / 19
were held as scheduled ten days later, the ruling LDP won a huge victory, taking an outright 
majority of seats in both houses.  In the more powerful House of Representatives, the LDP 
picked up 26 seats, to hold 284 out of 511.  There would be no need to negotiate the support of 
splinter parties now.  Ironically, many commentators attributed the LDP’s victorious result to a 
sympathy vote generated by the death of the nation’s leader.
 The loss of Ohira may have altered the course of Japan’s political development. He made 
signiﬁcant achievements during his short term in ofﬁce.  According to historian Kenneth B. 
Pyle, “Reﬂective and bookish by nature, an active Christian in his younger days, Ohira called 
into being a remarkable intellectual effort to define a purpose for Japan’s newly acquired 
economic power.”  Pyle describes Ohira’s vision that the nation should move on to a new age 
“transcending the age of modernization and moving from an age centered on the economy 
to an age stressing culture.”  To prepare his country for this new age, Ohira assembled “130 
of the country’s leading intellectuals, together with eighty-nine leading bureaucrats and 
divided them into nine research groups to debate and formulate a national agenda for Japan 
as it approached the twenty-ﬁrst century.”  The work of these research groups would lay the 
foundation for an ongoing process of administrative reform that would continue through 
succeeding administrations30.
 Following the elections, the Prime Minister’s chair was taken by Suzuki Zenko, a little-
known LDP Dietmember without an especially large powerbase.  He was generally viewed as 
a caretaker who might be able to mediate differences among party factions31.  The landslide 
provided Suzuki with the largest parliamentary majority enjoyed by any Prime Minister for 
many years.
 On May 27, just a few days before Ohira entered the hospital, the Cabinet approved a 
reform (kaizen) of government information distribution.  Noting that the government had 
long published voluminous information in many formats, including white papers, reports, 
regulations and others, the resolution required that this information be catalogued and made 
available at new information windows in government ministries.  The Cabinet resolution did 
not contemplate, however, that individuals would be able to ﬁle requests demanding speciﬁc 
government responses or that would be subject to appeal.  In essence, the new policy simply 
called for establishment of libraries of information the government itself chose to publish32. 
This new policy ﬁt perfectly with Dietmember Chimura’s comments at the Citizen Movement 
gathering held on May 31－perhaps there was no need for a new law at all.
 This was the situation when Ohira left the stage.  Once he was gone, there would be 
no major LDP leader who spoke about the importance of citizen access to government 
information.  On the other hand, there was no one who simply rejected the idea out of hand. 
30 Kenneth B. Pyle, The Japanese Question – Power and Purpose in a New Era (2d Ed.), American Enterprise 
Institute, 1996), pp. 68-71.
31 For a review of Suzuki’s administration from the viewpoint of a U. S. government ofﬁcial, see Olsen, supra 
n. 3, pp. 18-33.  (Olsen describes him as a “political dark horse,” and “a compromise candidate whom LDP 
faction leaders hoped would be able too unify an increasingly fractious party.”  p. 18)
32 Asai, “Kuni ni okeru Jōhō Kōkai no Genjō to Kadai” (Current Status and Topics Concerning Information 
Disclosure by the State) Jurist No. 742, June 5, 1981, p. 33.  Shimizu was not impressed; he contemptuously 
dismissed the government`s move as nothing more than “stirring and clouding up the tea” and quoted the 
Asahi assessment that most of the information presented had already been made available through existing 
government public relations activities.  See Repeta, “Citizens,” supra n. 7, text accompanying fn. 97. 
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Of course, there was no need to do so.  As long as the LDP held political power, it could easily 
squelch any proposals its leaders did not like.
The Asahi Shinbun to the Rescue
 One month after the LDP’s great electoral victory, Japan’s second largest newspaper 
surprised its readers with a new investigative series that ran on the upper left corner of the 
front page.  Titled “Toward an Open Government” (Hirakareta Seifu wo), the new series would 
continue (with periodic interruptions) for an amazing ten months, divided into five multi-
week mini-series.  The title for the ﬁrst one was “Report from the United States.”  In 1980, 
perhaps the strongest argument for many reforms was to claim that the Americans were doing 
it.  The eyes of the nation were ﬁxed on the superpower across the sea as the avatar of fashion, 
common sense and good government.  
 On July 22 Asahi Shinbun readers were told that the United States was the home of 
open government.  The story of the day focused on a 1978 American law called the Ethics in 
Government Act that addressed the timeless custom of delivering valuable gifts to powerful 
officials in hope of capturing their attention and perhaps their favor.  Under this new law 
ofﬁcials became bound to report their receipt of any gift with a value greater than one hundred 
dollars.  An Asahi reporter visited a federal government office to take a peek at President 
Carter’s report for 1979.  He found 117 entries.  Carter made a visit to Japan in June 1979, 
so the Asahi focused on details of the booty from that trip.  The report listed twenty items 
received from Japanese gift-givers, including a Canon A-1 camera valued at $ 775 and a Seiko 
quartz wristwatch valued at $ 370.  (The story was accompanied by a photo of the President’s 
young daughter Amy visiting the Mitsukoshi Department Store.) 
 In addition to the front-page series on open government, the Asahi provided readers with 
a lengthy primer on the US Freedom of Information Act on July 26.  And to illustrate the 
relevance of all this to Japanese readers, the newspaper carried yet another open government 
series on an inside page titled “Information Disclosure Interviews.”
 The subject of the ﬁrst interview was the mother of a girl who died of aplastic anemia 
in August 1973 at the age of 8.  The girl had been treated with chloramphenicol (kuromai), 
an inexpensive anti-microbial agent.  Anemia is a known side effect of the drug.  The woman 
ﬁled suit against the doctors who treated her daughter, two drug companies and the national 
government in August 1975.  Defendants denied liability on the ground that there was no 
proof that chloramphenicol was the cause of death.  Proving this causal relationship was a 
major challenge for the plaintiff.  In search of evidence, she requested the Ministry of Health 
to disclose the application for approval of the drug along with data submitted in support of the 
application and minutes of committee meetings held to consider the application. The request 
was denied.  At that time, such information was not disclosed to the public and there was no 
administrative procedure in place to enable people to request it.  She told the Asahi that she 
was turned away with the admonition that the information she sought contained valuable 
commercial secrets which would certainly not be disclosed33.
33 “Nani mo Shinai Yakusho wo Kokuhatsu” (Accusing Government Ofﬁces That Do Nothing), Asahi 
Shinbun, July 15, 1980.
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 In the course of the suit, the national government again denied requests for this evidence 
on the ground that members of such government panels would be unable to express their 
opinions freely if they knew that minutes might someday be released to the public34.  This 
argument would be heard many times throughout the long battle over an open government law. 
 In 1980 the Asahi Shinbun was delivering more than seven million copies per day 
throughout Japan.  Gaining such prominent coverage for open government in a big daily 
was a real coup For the Citizens Movement.  Constitutional experts and attorneys like 
Okudaira Yasuhiro, Shimizu Hideo and Akiyama Mikio deeply understood the importance of 
transparency and its relationship to democratic governance and their speeches and writings 
often achieved a high level of passion and eloquence, but they could only reach a small 
audience directly.35  The Asahi coverage brought an opportunity to raise the matter to national 
consciousness and turn it into a real political issue. 
 Recalling the sparse coverage attending release of the JCLU’s Model Information 
Disclosure Law a year earlier, Shimizu wrote that by the end of 1980 “most mass media have 
recognized information disclosure as one of the biggest issues of the 1980s.”  He had feared 
that many reporters would react negatively to a disclosure system, believing that it would get 
in the way of their traditional newsgathering practices.  But now it looked like they were on 
his side.  As for the Asahi’s front page series and other coverage, Shimizu would write that this 
could be the “decisive punch.”36 (ketteida) 
The Governor Shares His Vision
 Governor’s Nagasu’s monthly address to all prefectural employees was scheduled for 
July 28.  He used the occasion to reveal his plans for a new information disclosure system and 
to call upon them to step up and help make it a success37.  Undoubtedly, many of his listeners 
were also Asahi readers and had been mulling over the American disclosure system reported 
there.  After brieﬂy recounting progress on his information project, Nagasu took some time to 
lay out his own theoretical foundation for open government.  He focused on a short list of key 
characteristics:  “It is necessary.  It is unavoidable.  Moreover, it is possible.  However, it is 
also a big project.”
 In explaining why an information disclosure system was necessary, Nagasu noted that 
it was commonly said that we had evolved into an “information society.”  However, he 
claimed that although people were victims of information overload through advertising and 
other promotional messages, it was hard for them to gain access to information that was truly 
important, although it might be easily found in ﬁles at corporate and government ofﬁces.  In 
fact, he said the situation could be described as one of “information famine.”  His new system 
was necessary to enable people to ﬁnd information they really needed.
 Moreover, he thought the move toward open government was unavoidable.  Nagasu 
34 At that time, Japanese courts had limited power to compel defendants in civil trials to produce this kind of 
evidence.
35 Proﬁles of Okudaira, Shimizu, and Akiyama are provided in Repeta, “Citizens,” supra n. 7.
36 Shimizu, “Jōhō Kōkai wo Meguru Nihon no Jōkyō” (Conditions in Japan concerning Information 
Disclosure), Jiyu to Seigi, February, 1981, p. 9.
37 The full text of Governor Nagasu’s July 28, 1980 speech appears at 1984 Collection, 160-64.
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spoke of the importance of a citizens’ right to know in a democracy and of the budding 
movement for information disclosure laws all over Japan.  He foresaw that “information 
disclosure” would become one of the big political issues in the 1980s.  Worn out by so many 
tales of political corruption, he said people had lost faith in government and that such a system 
was necessary to recover it. The antidote to the people’s distrust of secretive government was 
transformation from entrustment of power to a central authority to decentralization featuring 
broad participation.
 Explaining the feasibility of such a system was much simpler; he simply cited examples 
from abroad.  Disclosure systems had already been implemented in countries like Sweden and 
Holland, and of course, the United States.
 Among the thousands of people at work in the Kanagawa government ofﬁces, there was 
only one required to stand before the voters.  The Governor took advantage of this unique 
position to give the bureaucrats a peek at how they were viewed by the man in the street.  
 “We all know the word ‘black box,’” he said. “In the realm of politics and government, 
important decisions concerning one’s own fate are made in some distant, dark or secret room.” 
Could the people see into that dark room?  “The kinds of information disposed of – and born 
– in those rooms can never be known.  And if you try to participate in this, there is no one to 
show you the way.”  Then, the suspicion:  “And don’t you think those secret rooms are ﬁlled 
with corruption?  This is the dissatisfaction, the uncertainty, embraced by many citizens.”
 Finally, he addressed the third major issue in his grand slogan, that this was a “big 
project”:
Frankly this project is related to the work of changing the fundamental nature and 
structure of Japan’s politics and government as they have evolved over the past century. 
Unless we have a commitment and an organization commensurate with the scale of 
this great project, our work will not proceed even a single step.  Speaking somewhat 
heroically, this is a kind of “revolution in government ofﬁces” to match a new age38.
 Three days later, Nagasu announced the creation of a new “Information Disclosure 
Preparation Ofﬁce,” with a full-time staff of eight persons working under the direction of a 
vice governor to lay groundwork for the new system.  On August 4, a formal interim report by 
an internal study group was released, providing details on the rules, the basic thinking behind 
the ordinance, and other details.  Fifteen months into its work, one of the most important 
recommendations of this committee was that it be replaced by an expanded committee with 
representatives of all prefectural departments.  To make progress, an entity with much greater 
authority would be required39.
The Governor Reaches Out to Academics and Other Local Governments
 Meanwhile, to support and expand upon these internal efforts, the Kanagawa “marketing 
plan” featured an external strategy as well.  Key external players would be academic experts, 
38 Id.
39 Id., p. 159.
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fellow local governments, the media, and of course, residents of Kanagawa themselves.
 In search of expert advice, Kanagawa officials reached out to academics.  Professor 
Horibe Masao, who would play a lead role in both drafting the ordinance and in implementing 
it once it came into force ﬁrst met with members of the original project team in 197840.  In 
addition to inviting Horibe and other academic experts to deliver lectures and advice, in the 
second half of 1980, Kanagawa ofﬁcials contracted with four academics to conduct speciﬁc 
research assignments intended to lay the foundation for the new rules.  As part of this work, 
Horibe would be charged with studying US disclosure rules and another member, Shiomi 
Kenzaburo, would research the law of Sweden.  Because there was no home-grown model, 
study of foreign systems was critical.  The work produced by these academic experts would 
serve as a resource not only to Kanagawa’s own planning teams; it would later be published by 
Kanagawa and shared with other local governments and transparency activists41.
 Four months after creating its “Preparation Ofﬁce,” Kanagawa would take a major step 
to reach out to colleagues around the country with a full day conference held in Yokohama 
on November 26, 1980.  The title of this conference was “Seeking Open Government” and it 
featured presentations by several professors from national universities, ofﬁcials invited from 
Hiroshima and Shiga, and, of course, Governor Nagasu himself 42.  In retrospect, this event 
can be seen as the kickoff to a nationwide campaign.  When the conference was held, the 
difference in attitudes between the national government ofﬁcials and local government leaders 
was stark.  Whatever national leaders might be thinking in Tokyo, local governments would 
not wait.
 The conference was attended by more than three hundred persons representing 78 local 
governments around Japan.  In his keynote address, Governor Nagasu declared again that 
information disclosure would become one of the great political issues of the 1980s – for both 
local governments and the national government.  He stressed that it was appropriate for local 
governments to take the lead because they are placed in “an intimate relationship with the 
daily lives of the people” (shimin no seikatsu to missetsu na kankei)43.
 By this time, many prefectural governments had formed their own information disclosure 
study committees.  Representatives of approximately 80 percent of local governments 
in attendance at the Yokohama conference reported that their governments had already 
commenced studying information disclosure systems or planned to do so soon44.
National Diet, November 1980
 On November 11 a Socialist member of the national Diet took the floor to ask the 
government to describe its position regarding information disclosure.  The response was 
delivered by future Prime Minister Nakasone Yasuhiro, at that time serving as Director of the 
Administrative Affairs Agency.
40 Masao Horibe, “Making Freedom of Information Laws in Japan – An Academic Lawyer’s Experience” 
Hitotsubashi Journal of Law and Politics vol. 20, pp. 33-45 (1992).
41 1984 Collection, pp. 172-73.
42 Id., p. 236.
43 1984 Collection at 169.  Nagasu was followed by a lineup of three professors from the law departments of 
elite national universities: Kobayashi Naoki, Okudaira and Horibe. Id., p. 237.
44 Hideo Shimizu, Jōhō Kōkai (Information Disclosure), p. 118 (Nihon Hyoronsha, 1981). 
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 Nakasone chose to divide the information disclosure issue into two fundamental 
segments: historical information and information related to contemporary policy. “In the U.S. 
and elsewhere,” he said, “they are disclosing records related to diplomacy.  I think this is an 
extremely important element in uncovering historical truth.  In the same way, I think Japan has 
a duty to clarify historical truth to the Japanese people and the world.  In addition, regarding 
contemporary information disclosure, concerning such issues as medical administration 
or nuclear power safety administration, I think it is desirable that the people are informed 
to the extent possible.”  After this statement of the “general principle,” he addressed some 
qualifications.  “However, there is the protection of various kinds of secrets, the protection 
of the people’s privacy, and there are business secrets and international relations.  Regarding 
issues like these, internal and external laws and regulations should be examined.  I think that 
to some degree there are appropriate limitations.  In any case, I sincerely believe that this is an 
era when politics and administration must move forward with courage facing the direction of 
history.”45
 Reviewing Nakasone’s Diet testimony, Shimizu delivered a wary response.  If the 
“appropriate limitations” Nakasone had in mind, “mean that national secrets would have 
priority, then the gap (between Nakasone’s idea and) the system we are requesting is ‘extremely 
large’” (kiwamete okii), he wrote.  The system we seek, he explained, “is one where the general 
principle is clearly that government information is disclosed; withheld information must be 
limited and exceptional.”46
Post-script
 Kanagawa’s information disclosure ordinance was adopted on October 14, 1982.  As 
events unfolded, Kanagawa would not be the ﬁrst government to take action.  It was beaten out 
by a small village in northern Japan which adopted its own information disclosure ordinance 
in March 1982.  Kanagawa’s system would be Japan’s second.  Nonetheless, as Yokohama 
attorney and activist Akira Morita would later write “from the standpoint of the effort and 
enthusiasm devoted to its creation, Kanagawa was in substance (jisshitsuteki ni) the leader 
nationwide; for better or worse it became the model for information disclosure ordinances that 
came thereafter.”47  In summarizing the Nagasu campaign of 1977-1982, Morita wrote that 
proponents of such a system “could foresee that there would be much internal opposition” and 
in order to succeed, they had “invested a great deal of human and ﬁnancial resources.”  Local 
governments in Tokyo, Osaka and other urban areas quickly followed the Kanagawa example 
and created information disclosure systems of their own. 
 By contrast, prospects for adoption of a national disclosure law remained poor.  With 
national security fears generated by the Miyanaga Affair, the loss of Ohira, and the thumping 
victory of the ruling party in June, the situation looked bleak indeed.  Reflecting on his 
45 Shimizu, “Jōhō Kōkai wo Meguru Nihon no Jōkyō” (Conditions in Japan concerning Information 
Disclosure), Jiyu to Seigi, February, 1981, p. 2.
46 Id., pp. 2-3.
47 Akira Morita, “Jōhō Kōkai Seido No Yukue” (“The Future Course of the Information Dsiclosure System”) 
in Yokokama Right to Know Group (Shiru Kenri Yokohama no Kai) (ed.) Jōhō Kōkai Katsuyō Jissen 
Manual (Akashi Shoten, 2000), p. 245.
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strategic situation at the end of 1980, Shimizu recalled that Professor Shinohara Kazu had 
suggested at the Yokohama conference that the Citizens Movement should set 1983 as the 
target for adoption of a national law.  Shimizu thought this was too optimistic.  He believed 
that unless the opposition parties could pull together and win control of the national Diet, there 
would be no national information disclosure law for Japan.  Prospects for a national law would 
be delayed, he thought, until the second half of the 1980s48.
48 Shimizu, “Jōhō Kōkai wo Meguru Nihon no Jōkyō” (Conditions in Japan concerning Information 
Disclosure), Jiyu to Seigi, February, 1981, p. 9.
